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U.S.-Mexican Trade: New Initiatives
Are Needed Now
by Harry A. Inman*
Mexico and the United States, as could be expected, have differ-
ences in their goals and objectives of international trade. These differ-
ences stem from their historical relationship and the varying social and
economic needs of each country relevant to their respective stages of de-
velopment. Responding to a long history of foreign economic domina-
tion, Mexico has pursued protectionist trade policies designed to
"Mexicanize" its industries. For example, Mexican corporate law re-
quires registration of any physical corporate presence, such as a plant in
Mexico, and limits foreign participation in that corporation to forty-nine
percent.' Similarly, Mexico has declined to enter the General Agree-
ments on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). 2 The United States, meanwhile,
has never had a coordinated, long-term trade policy toward Mexico.
Rather, the federal government traditionally has left the matter to the
private sector until a need for some particular product, such as oil and
gas, minerals or fruits and vegetables has prompted urgent trade negotia-
tions. Depending upon its level, cooperation in international trade be-
tween these two nations can reduce or increase these policy differences.
This overview of U.S.-Mexican trade will review the current issues facing
the governments of these two neighbors and offer meaningful suggestions
for alleviating existing problems and for promoting U.S.-Mexican trade
and cooperation.
Present situation
President Reagan, in his statement at the International Meeting on
* Partner, Patton, Boggs and Blow, Washington, D.C.; A.B. Harvard 1948; LL.B. Uni-
versity of Virginia 1951.
1 Law of the Promotion of Mexican Investment and the Regulation of Foreign Invest-
ment, ch. I, art. 5, Diario Oficial (Mar. 9, 1973), reprinted in (1973) 12 Int'l Legal Materials
643, 644 (1973) (English Translation). This law applies to corporations that come into existence
after May 8, 1973. The "Maquiladoras"-foreign manufacturing plants on the borders of Mex-
ico--are exempted from registration, however. See Inman & Tirado, A Mexican Dividend:
"Las Maquiladoras," 9 Int'l Law. 431, 436 (1975). See also infra notes 19 & 28 and accomp-
anying text.
2 As of 1979, Mexico had not joined GATT. See General Agreements on Tariffs and
Trade (Geneva), June 30, 1979, Protocol and Schedules, T.I.A.S. No. 9629. See also infra notes
II & 12 and accompanying text.
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Cooperation and Development in Cancun, Mexico, 3 recognized the dif-
ferent needs of countries in the world:
Middle-income countries need foreign capital, technical assistance and
the development of basic skills to improve their economic climate and
credit worthiness in international capital markets. The more advanced
developing nations which already benefit from the international econ-
omy, need increasing access to markets to sustain their development.4
The position of the Reagan Administration on international cooperation
was iterated at the Cancun meeting: trade, private investment, and
global growth, not the wholesale transfer of foreign aid, are the best
means for alleviating the problems in the developing countries. 5 This in-
cludes the encouragement of private investment and the lowering of
trade barriers.6 "Far too little world attention has been given to the im-
portance of trade as a key to development," 7 the President said.
In his State of the Nation address of September 1, 1981, Mexican
President Jos6 L6pez Portillo admitted that worldwide and regional is-
sues place Mexico in conflict with many policies of the Reagan Adminis-
tration. At the same time, the Mexican leader talked of the need for the
United States and Mexico to "transcend their traditional mold and look
for shared criteria and solutions."
A step toward the fulfillment of this need to "transcend traditional
molds" would be to lessen the emerging trade tensions between the
United States and Mexico. This step is vital to both nations: trade be-
tween the two countries reached almost $28 billion in 1980, making Mex-
ico the third ranking U.S. trading partner after Canada and Japan, and
the second largest market for U.S. exports. 9 Likewise, the Mexican Gov-
3 This conference was held October 21 and 22, 1981. It involved the leaders of 22 nations
and was designed to study the question of reducing hunger and poverty in the developing coun-
tries. Washington Post, Oct. 22, 1981, § A, at 1, col. 2. The countries represented were Algeria,
Austria, Bangladesh, Brazil, Britain, Canada, China, France, Guyana, India, Ivory Coast, Ja-
pan, Mexico, Nigeria, Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Sweden, Tanzania, United States, Venezuela,
West Germany, and Yugoslavia. Id., Oct. 23, 1981, § A, at 20, col. 5. The result of the meeting
was an agreement to support "a round of global negotiations" in the United Nations on eco-
nomic problems, but no agreement was reached on how or when to proceed. Id., Oct. 24, 1981,
§ A, at 1, col. 1.
4 President's Statement at the First Plenary Session of the International Meeting on Co-
operation and Development in Cancun, Mexico, 17 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 1185 (Oct. 22,
1981) [hereinafter cited as Speech at Cancun].
5 Washington Post, Oct. 24, 1981, § A, at 1, col. 1.
6 Id., Oct. 22, 1981, § A, at 1, col. 2. The Reagan Administration is vehemently opposed
to any new international agencies such as an "international energy agency" and is also opposed
to any changes in the power structure of the World Bank or the International Monetary Fund.
Id., Oct. 23, 1981, § A, at 20, col. 2.
7 Speech at Cancun, supra note 4, at 1186.
8 Washington Post, Sept. 2, 1981, § A, at 17, col. 1. Issues of conflict named by President
Portillo include the failure of the United States to ratify SALT II and his Government's support
for Cuba, Nicaragua, and leftist insurgents in El Salvador. Id.
9 Briggs, The United States and Mexico, Dep't St. Bull., July 1981, at 4-7 (statement
prepared for delivery before the Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs of the House Foreign
Affairs Committee on June 10, 1981). The largest market for U.S. exports currently is Canada.
Id.
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ernment has been seeking an annual rate of growth of seven percent, at
least through 1982, with particular emphasis on the energy and transpor-
tation sectors.' 0 Though it does not produce enough food even to feed its
own people, Mexico has tremendous potential for agricultural develop-
ment, an area in which cooperation with the United States could be mu-
tually beneficial.
The current status of trade relations has been well described in a
recent article by Thomas R. Graham, Esq., entitled "U.S.-Mexican
Trade: Growing Pains in the Partnership."" Mr. Graham discusses
generally the trade issues between the countries and the following sensi-
tive areas: (1) the U.S. Department of Commerce's imposition of coun-
tervailing duties on imports of Mexican leather wearing apparel that
benefit from the Mexican CEDI program;' 2 (2) the recommendation of
U.S. domestic industry and labor to attack the imposition of "perform-
ance requirements"'13 for foreign investors, i.e., requirements by a foreign
government as conditions for doing business in the country that investors
use local components and export a certain percentage of production [this
proposal is supported by the Reagan Administration]; 14 (3) the constant
pressure on the Administration from U.S. industries and labor groups to
"graduate" more Mexican products from eligibility under the Genera-
lized System of Preferences; 15 and (4) the U.S. support of the Multifiber
Agreement restricting textile and apparel imports. 16
10 International Trade Administration, U.S. Dep't of Comm., Pub. No. 79-146, Foreign
Economic Trends and Their Implications for the United States at 3 (1980).
1 Graham, Todo Indica que Ambos Paises Siguen Necesitandose, Expansion, Oct. 14,
1981, at 150-54 (English translation available in UNC Law School Library).
12 Id. at 151. For a recent decision, see Leather Wearing Apparel from Mexico, 46 Fed.
Reg. 3256 (1981) (ITC determined that Mexico was not a "country under the Agreement"
within 19 U.S.C. §1671(a)(Supp. I 1979); therefore, no finding of injury to domestic industry
was required to support imposition of a duty).
13 Graham, supra note 11, at 152. See "Performance Requirements," a study of the Inci-
dence and Impact of Trade Related Performance Requirements, and an analysis of Interna-
tional Law, The Labor-Industry Coalition for International Trade (1981).
14 Graham, supra note 11, at 152. Ambassador William E. Brock, U.S. Trade Representa-
tive, stated:
Trade-related investment incentives and performance requirements (e.g., export
performance and local content requirements) have serious trade-distorting effects.
They are becoming widely used by developing countries and even by some devel-
oped countries. We will deal with these issues and over the longer term seek to
negotiate new multilateral disciplines.
Joint Hearings before the Subcomm. on International Finance and Monetary Policy of the
Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 24 (1981) (open-
ing statement of William E. Brock).
15 Graham, supra note 11, at 152. To "graduate" means to lose eligibility under the Gen-
eralized System of Preferences. Effective March 31, 1981, many products were graduated from
Mexico. See U.S. Trade Representative Release, March 19, 1980. "Graduation" of a product
theoretically results when the nation or industry producing the product has developed suffi-
ciently to no longer deserve special treatment. In other words, the product or products are
competitive with products of the developed world, without the preferential treatment. See In-
man, A View of Mexican-U.S. Trade, 6 Int'l Trade L.J. 190, 194 (1980-81).
16 Graham, supra note 11, at 153. The current multifiber agreement restricts imports of
textiles and apparel from developing countries including Mexico. This is one of the few areas
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Another area of possible friction is the concern of U.S. labor regard-
ing Items 806.30 and 807.00 of the U.S. Tariff Schedules.1 7 Both these
tariff items promote, or at least do not discourage, manufacturing outside
the United States. Item 806.30 involves articles of metal, except precious
metal, that are manufactured or subjected to a process of manufacture in
the United States, exported for processing, and returned to the United
States for further processing. 8 The effect of Item 806.30 is to limit the
duty to the value of theforeign processing of these articles of metal.
Item 807.00 pertains to imported articles whose final assembly is in
Mexico, and thus require no further processing in the United States.19
The effect of Item 807.00 is to limit the duty upon the full value of the
imported products, less the value of the U.S. fabricated components con-
tained therein, to imported items assembled in foreign countries with
fabricated components that have been manufactured in the United
States. Item 806.30 was incorporated in the U.S. Tariff Schedules in
195620 and Item 807.00 in 1963.21
The need for new initiatives
On June 23, 1981, a Bilateral Trade Committee between the United
States and Mexico was established, and is co-chaired by U.S. Trade Rep-
resentative William Brock, Mexican Secretary of Commerce Jorge de la
Vega, and U.S. Commerce Secretary Malcolm Baldridge. The purpose
of the Committee is to lessen the "communication gap" between the two
countries and to improve generally U.S.-Mexican trade relations. 22
Trade incentives such as the Generalized System of Preferences and
Tariff Items 806.30 and 807.00, and communication mechanisms be-
tween countries such as joint commissions or special ambassadors, are
where developing countries can produce and compete. It is understood that the present Admin-
istration favors a simple renewal of the current agreement. However, Treasury Secretary Don-
ald Regan stated at the Cancun meeting that "as times go by," the United States "will be
prepared to discuss a liberalization of the 'multifiber agreement."' Washington Post, Oct. 23,
1981, § A, at 20, col. 3. How much "time" must "go by" is, of course, purely a matter of
speculation.
.7 19 U.S.C. § 1202 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980) (Items 806.30, 807.00).
18 19 U.S.C. § 1202 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980) (Item 806.30).
19 19 U.S.C. § 1202 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980) (Item 807.00). A number of manufacturing
plants called "Las Maquiladoras" have been established on the borders of Mexico to take ad-
vantage of Items 806.30 and 807.00. These assembly plant operations have the advantage of
limited duties, low labor costs, and accessibility to transportation. The industry is concentrated
primarily in electronic assemblies, finishing of shoes, textiles, and garments. See generally In-
man & Tirado, supra note I, at 431-40.
20 See 19 C.F.R. § 10.9 (1981).
21 Even though Item 807.00 was incorporated in the Tariff Schedules in 1963, it was not
until 1975 that Customs submitted Part 10 of its regulations setting forth definitions and inter-
preting crucial aspects of the item classification. See 19 C.F.R. § 10.12-.24 (1981). See also 28
Fed. Reg. 9020 (1963).
22 During the Carter Administration, a Consultive Mechanism was established which was
composed of various working groups. An Ambassador-at-Large and Coordinator of Mexican
Affairs was appointed with the primary duty to coordinate some 70 agencies working in the
Mexican trade area.
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important; however, they are not enough. New initiatives are needed if
the United States and Mexico desire to have a healthy climate of trade.
The following suggestions should be examined by the two governments
and adopted either individually or as a whole in an effort to foster trade
cooperation between the two economies.
One initiative that could be explored is free or limited duty trade for
both countries in certain commodities and services. For example, the
United States needs fluorspar, railroad freight cars, and farmworkers;
Mexico needs corn, wheat, insurance, and long-term financing services.
In addition, foreign trade zones could be established along the border of
the countries and in the principal cities within each country to help stim-
ulate trading. Second, even though Mexico now imports grains and cer-
tain food products, it should be a primary supplier for the Western
Hemisphere of most other agricultural and fishery products. The coun-
tries should coordinate their efforts to develop the potential of Mexico's
agricultural lands and sea. This could be accomplished by exchanging
experts, for example. 23
A third area for improving trade involves corporate investment reg-
ulations. Trade is encouraged by investment, and often precedes invest-
ment. The Mexican laws regulating foreign investment, technology and
inventions, and trademarks2 4 could be revised to allow exemptions for
certain companies. Often U.S. corporations hesitate to invest substantial
amounts in Mexico because of the forty-nine percent foreign stock own-
ership limitation, 25 and because of the limited duration and the low roy-
alty allowed under technical assistance or licensing agreements. 26 In
addition, there is always the concern that foreign ownership limitations
might be depleted even further by Government decree. A company sim-
ply cannot invest time, experience and technology, and not be able to
have effective discussion or control over decisions. Mexican laws could
be revised to allow a company to be incorporated with non-Mexicans
receiving more security and control over certain decisions, trademarks,
patents, and technology in specified areas that promote trade or further
the public interest of Mexico. 27 The "Maquiladora" concept of placing
a duty tax on only the value added in Mexico could be further developed
to include not only trade activity under Items 806.30 and 807.00 but also
23 At the Cancun meeting, President Reagan did offer to send volunteer teams of U.S. farm-
ers and agricultural experts to developing countries to help train farmers. Washington Post,
Oct. 23, 1981, § A, at 20, col. 2.
24 See Murphy, The Legal Framework for Foreign Investment in Mexico, in Private Inves-
tors Abroad-Problems and Solutions in International Business, Sw. Legal Foundation Proc.
55, 63-71 (1980).
25 Id. at 64. See also Hyde & Ramirez de la Corte, Mexico's New Transfer of Technology
and Foreign Investment Laws - To What Extent Have the Rules Changed?, 10 Int'l Law. 231,
241 (1976).
26 Hyde & Ramirez de la Corte, supra note 25, at 236.
27 See generally id. at 231-52.
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domestic distributions. 28
An area that is not regulated by the Mexican federal corporate law
is the investment in government bonds, private corporate securities, and
mutual funds. U.S. citizens and institutions should investigate and real-
ize the potential of this type of investment in Mexico. At the same time,
many states in the United States, though already promoting their liberal
corporate laws, also might grant tax or other incentives to Mexican com-
panies that invest in the state.2' The United States and Mexico should
also work out their differences over "performance requirements"3 0 for
investors in order to improve the climate for investment in Mexico.
Fourth, both the United States and Mexico should streamline their
customs and immigration procedures to allow products and people to
move more freely across the border.3 1 Presently, the United States has a
temporary business "B-1" visa that is easy to obtain and can be used for
transactions that amount to less than establishing a permanent business
relationship. 32 Mexico, on the other hand, has a "visitante" visa which is
complicated, takes several weeks to obtain and could be denied.3 3 In
addition, to promote Mexican agricultural and industrial development,
the Mexican immigration law should allow special exemptions for for-
eign technicians.
In certain instances, a company may have the raw material or prod-
uct but be unable to obtain sufficient financing. Thus, a fifth initiative
by the countries should be the encouragement of barter or hybrid barter
arrangements. Such arrangements also would overcome any currency ex-
change problems created by inflation or devaluation. Why couldn't a
loan made by a company in the United States to a company in Mexico
be paid off in inventory whether it be oil, gold, silver or a raw material?
Both countries should reexamine, where nccessary, the possibility of facil-
itating import licenses and easing other import barriers to permit such
barter transactions.
Sixth, there should be closer cooperation between governments and
private trade, labor, and business associations to promote exports and
imports. Trade, labor, and business associations in Mexico work closely
with the Mexican Government, and often participate on joint commis-
sions. 34 This is rarely true in the United States.
3 5
28 See Inman & Tirado, supra note 1, at 440. "Maquiladoras" are foreign manufacturing
plants that receive materials for processing from the United States, and when the goods are
returned, the United States applies a duty only on the value added by processing, i.e., the labor
cost. Id. Most important, the Maquiladoras are exempt from the 49% foreign ownership limita-
tion. Id. at 438.
29 To the author's knowledge, no state has yet considered such incentives.
30 See supra notes 13 & 14 and accompanying text.
31 See generally Graham, supra note 11, at 150-54.
32 22 C.F.R. 41.25 (1981).
33 A new visa agreement was reached on August 3, 1982 allowing U.S. businessmen on
temporary business to use the Mexican tourist visa between the United States and Mexico.
34 See Forbes, Nov. 23, 1981, at 153.
3.5 What is more likely in the United States is the independent and uncoordinated efforts
of a plethora of federal agencies, not to mention the influence of the dominant adversarial
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The encouragement of tourism is another initiative that should be
undertaken on a government level by both countries. Currently, the
Mexican Government actively supports and encourages tourism more
than the U.S. Government. : 1i The United States and Mexico could
streamline their customs procedures to allow tourists special exemptions
and accomodations. The Mexican Government even could consider
eliminating some of its restrictions on foreign purchase of real property.3 7
One of the sensitive trade areas mentioned earlier is the imposition
of the U.S. countervailing duties against certain imports from Mexico
without proof of injury.:8 It is unfair to penalize a country that, for eco-
nomic or political reasons, has not found it feasible to become a member
of GATT or sign the Subsidies Code. Why shouldn't the United States
treat Mexico as a "country under the agreement" with respect to the
International Counterveiling Duty Subsidy Code as the United States
has done in regard to India?39
Cities in Mexico 40 and the United States are the centers of eco-
nomic, political, and social power. A joint trade relationship between
cities of each country could be another productive step toward improved
trade between the two nations. Los Angeles and Mexico City, Monter-
rey and Pittsburgh, for examples, could exchange ideas and services re-
garding their environmental and traffic needs. Language proficiency,
student exchanges, and tourism could be promoted. The potential of this
form of cooperation is enormous.
Purchasing insurance at reasonable costs and obtaining long-term
financing for the purchase of homes or cars is not possible in Mexico.4 1
The Mexican Government should allow its citizens to legally purchase
insurance in the United States to cover a person or property in Mexico.
The Government should allow long-term financing from U.S. sources se-
cured by property in Mexico for home mortgages and the purchase of
cars. Barriers to trade in such services as insurance and banking will
command considerable attention in trade talks during the next few years.
relationships that exist among labor, business, and government in the United States today. See
Graham, The Reorginization of Trade Policy Making: Prospects and Problems, 13 Cornell Int'l
L.J. 221, 228 & n.38 (1980).
36 See Forbes, supra note 33, at 154-61.
37 For more discussion on Mexican restrictions on holding real property, see Hyde & Ra-
mirez de la Corte, supra note 25, at 241. See also Murphy, supra note 24, at 65-66.
38 See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
39 Determination Regarding the Application of Certain International Agreements, 46
Fed. Reg. 48,391 (1981).
40 Mexico's population was 67% urban in 1980, as compared to 51% in 1960. The World
Bank, 1981 World Development Report 173 (August 1981).
41 Foreign insurance and banking companies are not allowed to do business in Mexico.
They can have an office there, as does National City Bank, but cannot transact business. The
cost of Mexican insurance is very high, and the banks offer short term loans at high interest
rates only.
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Finally, the United States or certain border states should allow Mex-
ican laborers to work legally in the United States on certain temporary
projects as was allowed in the "Bracero Program" in 1951.42 This would
not only relieve the labor and population pressures in Mexico but also
provide needed farm labor in the United States.
Conclusion
Obviously, the initiatives outlined here require varying degrees of
mutual sacrifice. The United States and Mexico are continually bat-
tered by internal and external pressures, such as the U.S. labor unions'
opposition to the Bracero and Maquiladoran Programs. But a closer
economic relationship can ease these pressures and better serve the long-
term economic and political interests of the two nations and their people.
More than general discussions or the appointment of special ambassa-
dors and joint commissions is needed; there should be a willingness to
search for and realistically evaluate new initiatives. Each country is gen-
erally aware of what is needed and where the problems are but little is
done to solve them. Considering the closeness and trade vulnerability of
these two neighbors, why wait until problems become acute before evalu-
ating and negotiating these and any other bilateral initiatives?
Postscript:
Since this article was prepared in February 1982, there have been
many changes in Mexico. Mexico is now a country in financial crisis
with external debts of more than $80 billion, inflation of nearly 100%
and unemployment of nearly 50%. It has experienced two devaluations
and exchange controls. All private banks have been nationalized and the
value of the peso has tumbled. Mexico has, however, agreed to accept the
guidance of the International Monetary Fund in connection with its
monetary policy.
On December 1, 1982, Miguel de la Madrid Hurtado became Presi-
dent and announced an austerity plan. He has appointed capable per-
sons to his Cabinet, many of whom are considered economic
conservatives. Trade at this time is vital to Mexico-perhaps even more
than loans. It is time for a frank and fair appraisal of our trade
relationship.
42 The "Bracero Program" was an agreement between the two national governments by
which workers from Mexico were imported to the United States for temporary employment in
agriculture. See Act ofJuly 12, 1951, Pub. L. No. 78, Ch. 223, 65 Stat. 119 (formerly codified at
7 U.S.C. §§ 1461-68), as amended by Act of Dec. 13, 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-203, 77 Stat. 363.
The Act expired on Dec. 31, 1964.
